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NOTES
betterment can be as important, or more important, than the end itself-
and to them alone.
LEGAL HISTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL
The story of the public trial begins with the invasion of England by
William the Conqueror in 1066. Although the Norman legal system dif-
fered from that of the Anglo-Saxons, William assured his new subjects
that they were to be governed by the laws that had existed during the
reign of Edward the Confessor.' Except for a few changes in the sub-
stantive law and the establishment of a more centralized judicial system
this promise was substantially fulfilled.2 There were at least two reasons
for this policy of following the Anglo-Saxon legal customs. First, Wil-
liam had purported to be the lawful heir to the throne of Edward the
Confessor.' By maintaining the legal status quo there was always the
slight possibility of convincing the conquered subjects of the truth of
this assertion.' Secondly, in this newly acquired kingdom he had the
task of keeping the peace. There was nothing that resembled a public
police force, nor did there exist, at that time, any machinery by which
such a body could be established. By accepting the Anglo-Saxon customs
and laws William was able to build upon an already existing system of
law. By allowing this judicial system to remain as it was before the
conquest the problem of policing the vast new kingdom was partially
solved.
In early England the most common form of justice was carried out
by the tribe or the community.' Whenever a person committed a wrong
against another member of the community he was considered as having
1. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 67 (2d ed. 1898) [here-
inafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND]; JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 17
(5th ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as JENKS].
2. POTTER, ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1943).
3. ". . . William, on more than one occasion . . .promised to the English . . .
their 'law,' . . . the rights they held, 'on the day when King Edward . . .was alive
and dead."' JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 13 (5th ed. 1953).
4. In addition it may be recalled that the Norman law was largely unrecorded.
That which was recorded was French. The English had a relatively sound body of
recorded law. The laws of Edward the Elder, Edgar, and Cnut had been recorded.
Upon his arrival in England William found a body of customs and laws in existence.
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 65, 67.
5. "These old customary rules were the ancient custom observed by the people for
countless generations. They were administered only as such rules could be in a general
meeting, or court, composed of all the freemen of the neighborhood .. " POTTER, op.
cir. .upra note 2, at 7.
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had committed a wrong against the entire community. Thus, the indi-
vidual was tried by the whole community and judged by communal law
and custom.' These tribunals were known as the County, the Hundred,
and the Manor Courts. Under this system each of the subjects belonged
to a specific community and had to seek justice from that community.
The procedure in these courts was quite simple. The freemen, who com-
posed the tribunals were judges of both law and fact. There were no
professional lawyers and many of the trials were held in the open air.'
Thus, from the earliest times the English trials were held in public. All
of this did not stem from the concept that a public trial was a right. The
English did not think of themselves as conducting a public trial in its
modem legal sense. This form of trial existed in early England because
of the manner in which the courts were conducted. This was by neces-
sity a public trial.
In 1166 the Assise of Clarenden was passed. This act, the fore-
runner of the modern day indictment, required that in every criminal
trial a full court be assembled and at least twelve freemen be present who
could charge the accused with a specific offense.' The act made attend-
ance at a trial one of the principal duties of the English freeman and as a
result the community trial appears to have become a burden rather than
a right of the people. There were instances when fines were levied
against a person who did not attend a trial or send a qualified representa-
tive.9 If a wrong-doer was not tried or a false judgment was rendered
the entire Hundred was forced to pay a penalty." In addition to attend-
ing the Hundred Court there was the duty to attend the County Court."1
The courts were frequently a great distance from the homes of the parties
held responsible for attendance. Farm and business obligations were
often sacrificed to make court attendance possible. 2
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continental judicial
procedure had exerted a marked influence upon the English law.'3 The
6. JENKS 5.
7. It has been indicated that private courts were held in the house of the lord who
had jurisdiction. But the early Hundred and County Courts appear to have been held in
the open. Id. at 37, 38; PLUCKNETT, A CONcIsE HISTORY OF THE CoM.%MoN LAW 91 (5th
ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as PLUCKNE r].
8. JENKs 40.
9. Apparently a party had the right to send a servant or representative. This
would relieve him of his duty to attend court. 1 POLLACK & MAITLAND 532-46.
10. PLTJCKNETT 88.
11. Id. at 90.
12. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 538. Evidently the framers of the Magna Carta did not
feel the community trial a right. A clause in that instrument limits the terms of the
courts. Id. at 539.
13. Many of the continental practices violated the common law. "But it is also
clear from the works of Fortesque, Smith & Coke . . . that the use of torture was
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most usual continental abuses were the use of torture, the secret trial, and
the violation of the right against self-incrimination. 4 While the English
adopted the use of torture and had denied the right against self-
incrimination, the secret trial was not used. There were several reasons
for this. There was a necessity for a community trial in early English
history. This was true even after the courts had begun to be adminis-
tered by lawyers. The community trial was a useful tool in the hands
of the Crown."5 Later, when the primitive form of jury trial began to
appear there again existed the necessity for having members of the com-
munity participate in the trial. 6 The philosophy of the English mon-
archs constituted another reason why the community trial was never
abandoned. Unlike the monarchs of other countries, the English mon-
archs purported to act within the tenor of the law." The king may have
acted absurdly, but by the use of a community trial the people were, in
effect, invited to examine the legal proceedings. This would also have
a psychological effect upon the people in two ways. It would give the
people the opportunity to observe the courts in action while making it
appear that they had some power over the king. Secondly, by convicting
the accused in front of the populace, a would be wrong-doer would give
much thought to the predicament of the accused before placing himself
in a similar situation.
Although some form of community participation in criminal trials
has existed in every period of English judicial history this convention
for centuries provided little or no protection for the accused. Even
though the concept of the public trial may have taken the nature of a
fundamental right, it was valueless at a time when the populace had no
power to curb infringements of their basic rights. The situation exist-
ing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is illustrated by the opera-
wholly contrary to the common law." 5 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 184,
185 (1924) [hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH].
14. ESMEIN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 130 (1913).
15. "The open examination of witnesses viva 'voce in the presence of all mankind,
is much more conclusive to the clearing up of the truth than the private and secret ex-
amination. . . ." 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372. This is also the position taken
by Professor Wigmore. 6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE 1834 (3d ed. 1940).
16. The court would receive a verdict from this body, and from this verdict the
court would form its conclusions. It was not uncommon to have as many as eighty-four
jurors sitting at a trial. PLUCKNETT 120-24. Thus, the early jury trial was in and of
itself a public trial.
17. The conduct of the English king was always clothed with some form of legal
efficacy. In this kind of atmosphere a community trial would always give the conduct
of the king the appearance of legality. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAw 45 (5th ed.
1953).
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tion of the Star Chamber." Although the Star Chamber has been his-
torically associated with the in camera proceeding, secret trials were not
held in that tribunal. 9 On the other hand, the effective right to a trial
by jury was denied. The defendant was not allowed the privilege of
being confronted by witnesses. There was no privilege against self-
incrimination. The defendant was denied the effective aid of counsel.
The accused was unable to call witnesses in his own behalf. In many
cases torture was used to exact a confession.2" The accused was often
questioned in private.2'
For a nation that purported to be governed by a rule of law, prac-
tices such as those which existed in the Star Chamber could not long be
tolerated.22 Public opinion began to run high against the tribunal with
the result that the common law lawyers and judges united with parlia-
ment to achieve the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641.23 Many of
its unfair practices remained, however and the people were still dissatis-
18. In early English legal history the king had a body of learned men to aid him
in answering questions of law and to formulate legislative policy. This body was known
as the King's Council. The Council had both legislative and judicial power. Eventually
the division between the legislative and judicial duties of the Council became more
pronounced. When the Council sat as a judicial body it came to be known as the Court
of the Star Chamber. CARTER, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CouRTs 79, 80 (5th ed.
1927) ; 5 HOLDSWORTH 156; 1 PoLLOcK & MAITLAND 93. See also, Note, 12 AM. L. REV.
21.
19. This concept of the Star Chamber's secret procedure is reflected in some of the
modern cases. See Davis v. United States, 247 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1917). This is in-
correct as Professor Holdsworth points out. "It is true that the prisoner was prevented
from calling witnesses and preparing his defense .... But the trials were at least pub-
lic." 5 HOLDSWORTH 195.
20. Id. at 185.
21. "1.) The prisoner was kept in confinement more or less secret till his trial,
and could not prepare for his defense. He was examined and his ex-
amination was taken down.
2.) He had no notice beforehand of the evidence against him .... He had
no counsel either before or at the trial . . . the witnesses were not
necessarily . . . confronted with the prisoner.
5.) It does not appear that the prisoner was allowed to call witnesses in his
own behalf. . . ." 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRImiNAl. LAW OF
ENGLAND 350 (1883).
However, the actual proceedings of the Star Chamber were open to the public. 5 HOLDS-
WORTH 195.
22. Among the first to attack the power of the Star Chamber were the common
law lawyers and judges. here was much apprehension among the members of the legal
profession in regard to the Star Chamber usurping the power of the common law.
CARTER, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH COURTS 87 (5th ed. 1927) ; 1 HOLDSWORTH 508, 509.
23. The Star Chamber was not the only court that existed during this period that
incurred the wrath of the public. For example, the council of Wales, Marches and the
council of the North used many of the same techniques as the Star Chamber. 1 HOLDS-
WORTH 512-14.
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fied with the existing procedure.24 Many other reforms soon followed,
some of which merely strengthened existing traditions while others intro-
duced new concepts.2
The most important new concept to evolve from the era of the Star
Chamber was that of a completely independent jury.26 During the period
of the Star Chamber there were many instances where a jury was threat-
ened with a fine, imprisonment, or the ordeal of facing the Star Chamber
if it failed to bring in a verdict as directed by the court.2 In 1670 the
famous decision in Bushel's case freed the jury from any interference and
coercion by the court.2" Other fundamental rights which an accused began
to enjoy included the right to call witnesses in his own behalf, the right
to be represented by counsel and the right against self-incrimination."
It was during this evolutionary period that the public trial came to
be thought of as a right of a free citizen." Much of the power of the
Crown had been wrested into the hands of the people and important new
rights and liberties had been acquired. The public trial, although it had
always been the custom, acquired new significance. It gave the indi-
vidual protection against being denied any of his other fundamental
rights. A public trial would make it difficult for a judge to abuse a jury
or the accused. Any such abuses would cause much public indignation.
Thus, it must have seemed implicit that the public trial was as much an
essential element of a fair trial as any of the newer conventions.
In the light of Blackstone's argument for the public trial it would
be incorrect to think of the public trial as having evolved into an exclu-
sive right of the subjects." It was also a benefit to the Crown, but in a
different manner than it had been previously. This form of trial as-
sured justice to all parties. Thus, the public trial came to serve a dual
24. The jury was still coerced by the courts, and the accused was not allowed to be
represented by counsel. For some interesting illustrations of these practices see FOR-
SYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 331-53 (1875).
25. For instance, the jury trial had existed in some form or another since the thir-
teenth century. PLUCKNETT 120.
26. The early jury trial like the public or community trial was not considered a
right of the individual. Such a trial at that time was in fact thought of as a denial of
a right. Id. at 125.
27. Id. at 125-35.
28. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
29. 1 HOLDSWORTH 336; JENEs, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 72 (5th ed. 1953);
3 WIGMORE, EVmENcE 2250 (3d ed. 1940). By the beginning of the eighteenth century
the English had developed most of the legal concepts that today are considered necessary
ingredients of a fair trial.
30. During this period we find individuals demanding a public trial. It is inferred
from this that these individuals felt that their rights would be assured if the public was
admitted to the proceedings. See The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilbourne, 4
How. ST. TR. 1270 (1649).
31. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372.
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purpose. It insured the integrity of the judicial system, and protected
the rights of the accused.
At the dawn of the American Revolution the English subjects were
enjoying a fair trial. Many of the elements of a fair trial can be found
in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The framers
of that amendment had the same motives as their English forefathers
had when they were formulating these legal concepts. They believed
that in a nation which was to be governed by a rule of law, formulated
by the people, the public trial was essential in order to assure the accused
a fair trial. Further, it is not unsound to assume that the concept had
a dual purpose in the United States as it did in England, maintaining
judicial integrity and assuring the people as well as the accused a fair trial.
Modern courts have had much difficulty formulating a workable
legal standard for the public trial. It is agreed that a public trial does
not entitle admittance to all members of the public, e.g., the courts do
not deny a trial judge the privilege of excluding unruly members of the
public. 2 Problems have, however, arisen when the public has been ex-
cluded from the courtroom for other reasons. Also, questions develop in
regard to the precise point in a trial at which the public may be excluded,
how many members of the public can lawfully be excluded, whether the
accused can waive a public trial or demand that the public not be ad-
mitted to his trial, and what effect the courts will give to the fact that
a person has been denied a public trial.3"
As to the right of the accused to waive the public trial some courts
have decided that the right belongs solely to the accused ;4 thus, to waive
it is his privilege. At least one court has argued that the public trial is
a right belonging to the public as well as to the accused ;5 therefore, it
cannot be waived at the mere whim of the accused. In the latter juris-
diction the defendant is not deemed to have waived his right by failure
to have raised a timely objection."6 In the former jurisdictions the right
has been deemed to have been waived by failure to raise the issue at the
trial."
32. Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917) ; People v. Hartman,
103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894) ; 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS 647 (8th ed.
1927).
33. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1436 (1956).
34. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Henderson v. State,
207 Ga. 206, 60 S.E.2d 345 (1950).
35. Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294 (1948).
36. An attorney cannot waive a defendant's right to a public trial without the de-
fendant being present. State v. Delzoppo, 86 Ohio App. 381, 92 N.E.2d 410 (1949).
37. Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 21 N.W.2d 328 (1946); State v. Smith, 90
Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
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The courts have not always been in accord as to what effect should
be given to the outcome of a trial where the defendant has shown that he
has been denied a public proceeding. It has been held that even when
the accused can show that his trial was not public he still must be able to
show an injury resulting from the denial of such a trial or the court
should refuse a reversal." Other jurisdictions have considered the de-
nial reversible error ipso facto.3"
A problem which is central to all of these questions is the determina-
tion of what constitutes a public trial. In obscenity cases where the
general public have been excluded it has been held that the requirement
has been met in so long as the proceedings are not secret.4" Other courts
have held that in special instances the right to have spectators present
might be curtailed, but these courts have said that this curtailment cannot
be total except in extraordinary circumstances. 4 The courts have not
been precise in defining a legal standard for the public trial. In light of
its historical development, and its purpose for being in the Constitution,
a legal standard should be developed keeping within the tenor of this
purpose. In keeping with the spirit and purpose of the public trial the
trial judge should be allowed to exclude certain classes of the public upon
the showing of a necessity for such. The denial of such a trial should
be considered a prejudicial error unless there is a proper showing of a
necessity. There should be no precise definition as to how many mem-
bers of the public must be present to constitute a public trial.4 The legal
standard should be a standard that would be applied in each individual
case according to the facts in that case. The question should be whether
the accused and the people, in light of all circumstances, were afforded
a public trial to the extent that there was reasonable assurance that a fair
trial was carried out.
The purpose of the public trial is to insure the individual those
fundamental rights which are requisite ingredients of a fair trial. When,
38. Callahan v. United States, 240 Fed. 683 (9th Cir. 1917); Reagan v. United
States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913).
39. Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917). But in Tanksley v.
United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944), the 9th Circuit adopted the same views as
held by the 8th Circuit. The state courts still appear to be split on this point. People
v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222, 14 Pac. 849 (1887) ; People v. Harris, 302 Ill. 590, 135 N.E. 75
(1922) ; State v. Rime, 209 Iowa 864, 226 N.W. 925 (1929); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y.
56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
40. Scott v. State, 249 Ala. 304, 30 So.2d 689 (1947); Keddington v. State, 19
Ariz. 457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918).
41. People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 192, 190 P.2d 290 (1948) ; Neal v. State, 86
Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294 (1948).
42. "It is for the protection of all persons accused of crime . . . that they may be
awarded a fair trial." People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 286, 50 N.W. 995, 998 (1891).
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by the circumstances of the individual case, the public trial is found to
undermine a fair trial it should be modified to conform with its original
purpose.
